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tempt to return occurred and the buyer continued to sell the
baskets up to the date of the trial. The Court of Appeals
affirmed a judgment disallowing rescission. It emphasized the
fact that the buyer had a choice of defenses under the Uniform
Sales Act, which has been adopted in Illinois.4" The buyer could
have kept the baskets and set up the breach of warranty in diminution of the sales price; could have kept the baskets and sued the
seller for damages for breach of warranty; or could have
rescinded the contract and offered to return the baskets. But, said
the court, "rescission implies renunciation of the sale and disclaimer of the ownership of the goods." As the buyer had continued to sell the baskets long after discovery of the defects in the
merchandise, an affirmance of the contract had occurred, thereby
nullifying the later attempt to rescind. No partial rescission was
possible for the sales contract was entire, involving one sale of
one type of waste basket at a uniform price. The fact that delivery was to be made in installments did not change the nature of
the contract nor permit of any deviation from the principles governing rescission.

III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES

Of prime importance to the attorney who is about to commence
litigation is the fact that he must be certain that the tribunal to
which he expects to present his case is one competent to grant the
desired relief or, stated differently, is one possessed of jurisdiction
both in terms of power to hear and determine the controversy and
in ability to exercise control over the litigants. As to the first of
these points, the unsettling influences growing out of the decision
in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,' which spoke
particularly with regard to the jurisdiction of city courts in Illinois, culminated during the year in the surprising decision of the
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 1 et seq. Section 69 in particular delineates the remedies of the buyer.
1 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E.

(2d)

82 (1942).
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Appellate Court for the First District in United Biscuit Company
of America v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 2 wherein it was held that
the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago was without power
to entertain a transitory tort cause of action arising beyond the
city limits even though personal jurisdiction could properly be
obtained over the parties. That result was attained on the basis
that the court in question, although created under a special "home
rule" amendment to the state constitution, 3 was similar in character to those courts "in and for" cities authorized by Section 1
of Article VI thereof, hence, like the other city courts in the state,
was limited by the decision in the Werner case. Neither the legislature, the courts, nor the bar have been satisfied with the jurisdictional limits imposed by the Werner decision and attacks have
been made thereon from time to time. 4 It is not surprising,
therefore, to learn that a certificate of importance has been issued
in the United Biscuit Company case in an effort to secure clarification on this vital point of jurisdiction.5
Concerning the acquisition of jurisdiction over the litigants,
some points respecting service of process were made in the case
of Cannatav. White Owl Express, Inc.,6 in which wrongful death
action a summons addressed to both a non-resident corporate
defendant and its truck driver was served by delivering copies
thereof to the truck driver while he was attending a coroner's
inquest. The corporation did not learn of the suit until default
judgment had been pronounced against it. In support of a motion
to vacate such judgment, it argued that (1) being a non-resident,
its only official agent within the state was the Secretary of State
2340 IR. App. 503, 92 N. E. (2d) 478 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvizw 246-53.
3 IR. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34, adopted November 8, 1904.
4 In Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, 406 Ill. 573, 94 N. E. (2d) 438 (1950), not in the
period of this survey, the Supreme Court held that a city court could entertain
transitory causes arising beyond city limits. By so doing, it nullified the holding
in the Werner case.
5 The Supreme Court, on November 27, 1950, not in the period of this survey,
announced its reversal of the Appellate Court holding: 407 Ill. 488, 95 N. E. (2d)
The basis for the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago was said
439 (1950).
to rest on Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34, which contains no limitation on the right
to entertain jurisdiction over transitory causes. As personal jurisdiction and
venue requirements were satisfied, the court was ordered to proceed with the case.
Leave to appeal has been denied.
6 339 IR. App. 79, 89 N. E. (2d) 56 (1949).
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and no attempt had been made to serve him;7 (2) no copy of the
summons had been mailed to the office of the corporation, 8 and
(3), the driver in question was immune from service at the time
because he was present in the state solely for the purpose of
attending the inquest. An order denying the motion to vacate was
affirmed when the court held that there was nothing in the law to
prevent a non-resident corporation from having two or more
agents on whom process might be served; that there was no legal
requirement for the mailing of a copy of the summons where
substitute service is had by delivering the same to the corporate
agent in person; and that there is no immunity granted to one
within the state for the purpose of attending an inquest, at least
not with regard to causes growing out of the conduct which necessitates the holding of the inquest.9
It would seem obvious that if prejudicial error occurs in an
attempt to serve a summons, only the defendant affected thereby
should be allowed to complain. In Giles v. Fenska Furniture
Company,' ° process against the corporate defendant had been
served on one who was said to be its agent. He appeared in person and, on special appearance filed in his own name supported by
his personal affidavit, moved to quash the service on the ground
he was not, nor ever had been, agent for the company. It was held
not to be error to deny his motion since he was, to all appearances,
a total stranger to the litigation, hence had no standing to question
any error which may have occurred therein.
Recognized differences, of course, exist as to the form of
service necessary for the acquisition of jurisdiction over a defendant in an in personam proceeding in contrast with that form
which may be sufficient in an in rem action. Although authority
may exist for the joinder of two or more causes of action in the
7 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.111, and Vol. 2, Ch. 95',
§ 23,
as to the possibility of service in that fashion.
8 The defendant apparently confused Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 137.
which has to do with substituted service on another for an individual defendant.
and does require the mailing of a copy of the summons, with Ibid., § 141, relating
to service of process on private corporate defendants.
9 Willard v. Zehr, 215 Ill. 148, 74 N. E. 107 (1905).
The precise problem arose
in Husby v. Emmons, 148 Wash. 333, 268 P. 886, 59 A. L. R. 46 (1928), where the
same result was achieved.
10339 Il1. App. 536, 90 N. E. (2d) 570 (1950).
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same suit," the fact that one of the claims may be of in rem
character does not warrant the assumption that an in rem type
of service will be sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the same
defendant as to the in personam aspects of the same case, except
that the defendant may, by general appearance, submit to the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction. The trial judge, in Myers
v. Myers,1 2 apparently acting on the idea that any attempt to
induce the defendant to come within the jurisdiction and to file
such an appearance smacked too much of fraud, ordered the plaintiff to withdraw the in personain claims there made against the
non-resident defendant notified by publication under penalty of
sustaining a motion to quash the in rein service. When the plaintiff failed to do as directed, the service by publication was quashed
and the entire suit was dismissed. It was held to be error to so
decide, for the court was empowered to proceed, and should have
proceeded, as to the in rem aspects of the case, although it was
3
competent to dismiss the other portion of the proceeding"
Legislative tinkering with the statute concerning substitute
service of process in cases growing out of the use of the highways
has been noted.' 4 Prior to these changes, there may have been
some doubt as to the outcome of an attempt to use substitute
service against a resident motorist who departed from the state
before suit could be instituted, 15 but the abstract opinion in Glineberg v. Evans16 would tend to indicate that normal methods for
service 1 7 remain available at least until such time as the resident
11 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 168.
12 341 Ill. App. 406, 94 N. E. (2d) 100 (1950).
13 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.5(2), permits a court. on its own
motion, to dismiss an action when it appears that the plaintiff fails to show
"reasonable diligence" to obtain service. A plaintiff's inability to obtain service
should have the same effect as a lack of diligence, otherwise the court calendar
i-,ould become clogged with cases which it never would be able to hear.
14 See comment in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REViEw 26 on the 1949 amendment of
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 95w, § 23. The decision in Leighton v. Roper, 300
N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950), and in Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N. W.
(2d) 777 (1950), both noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviEw 347-54, would indicate the presence of other defects in the statute cited, calling for still further
legislation.
15 In that regard, see Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525
(1947), noted in 26 CHIaAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 159.
16341 Il. App. 332, 93 N. E. (2d) 520 (1950), abst. opin.
17 The process was there served on a member of the defendant's family at his
usual place of abode in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 137.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-19],9-1950

motorist has reached his intended destination and has taken up
18
a permanent residence there.
Where jurisdiction over the person, in an in rem proceeding,
rests entirely upon service by publication, the statute advisedly
permits the defendant an opportunity to appear and be heard
touching the default decree which may have been entered against
his property or status. The practice at one time made it mandatory to permit such a defendant to plead and obtain a hearing
as if no decree bad been entered, 19 but the present provision contemplates a prior hearing on the sufficiency of the notice before
any order is made setting aside the decree, reopening the case, and
permitting a course of pleading to the suit.20 Some confusion
appears to have been evident, on the part of the trial judge, in
Vancuren v. Vancuren,21 for a decree of divorce was there set
aside and the action was ordered abated because of the death of
one of the parties although no hearing had been had, nor finding
made, as to the sufficiency of the notice by publication. The order
was reversed on appeal with a direction to proceed in the fashion
laid down in the statute.
In addition to obtaining jurisdiction by proper service, the
attorney should see to it that the court is advised of the incapacity
of a party to conduct his own defense in order that adequate representation may be provided for such person. Reminder is again
served, through the medium of the decision of the Appellate Court
for the Second District in the case of Jacklich v. Starks,2 2 that no
valid judgment can be pronounced against a minor defendant
unless he has been represented by a guardian ad litem and that
any such judgment is subject to be reversed even though the quesis The headnote would indicate that the defendant left Illinois two days before
the process server called at his place of abode but that the service was accomplished prior to the time the defendant reached California and while he was en
route to that state.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1929, Ch. 22, § 19, repealed by Laws 1933, p. 785.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(8).
21340 Ill. App. 231, 91 N. E. (2d) 616 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
22338 Ill. App. 433, 87 N. E. (2d) 802 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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tion be not raised prior to the time the same reaches the reviewing
3
tribunal.2
The right to maintain a wide variety of legal remedies is generally limited by the requirement that suit should be promptly
brought, for varying periods of limitation will operate to bar such
remedies if not begun in apt time. Some new points have been
made this year in that regard. No specific reference, for example,
has been made in any statute to a period of limitation on the right
to seek a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court once declared
that the ten-year statute is inapplicable, 24 so it was urged, in
People ex rel. Stubblefield v. City of West Frankfort,25 that proceedings of that character would necessarily be controlled by the
five-year rule of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 26 for they
' 27
constitute a type of civil action "not otherwise provided for."
The court, however, refused to follow that line of reasoning and,
lacking acceptable precedent, held that a mandamus action based
on a failure of a public official to act for more than ten years was
not barred by the mere lapse of time.28 The court did recognize that the doctrine of laches might be invoked, particularly
against a private relator, 29 but regarded that issue as being one
which should be presented as an affirmative defense, 30 hence not
included under an answer relying specifically on a bar by reason
of lapse of time.
23 The court also there noted that, since the enactment of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216, it is permissible for the reviewing court to affirm a judgment
against an adult co-defendant at the same time that it reverses as to the unrepresented minor, for judgments no longer possess the unitary character they enjoyed
under the older procedure. See also Shaw v. Courtney, 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E.
(2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REViEw 249, affirmed in 385 Ill.
559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944).
24 Murphy v. City of Park Ridge, 298 Ill.
66, 131 N. E. 256 (1921).
25 340 Ill. App.443, 92 N. E. (2d) 531 (1950).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16.
27 There is dicta to that effect in Murphy v. City of Park Ridge, 298 Ill. 66 at 74,
131N. E. 256 at 259 (1921), for the court there said: "The only statute of limitations, if any was applicable, was the five-year limitation."
28 In general, see 35 Am. Jur., Mandamus, § 313.
29 See Preston v. City of Chicago, 246 Ill. 26, 92 N. E. 591 (1910).
30111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §167(4), refers to "laches" as being a
particular form of affirmative defense which must be "plainly set forth in the
answer."
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31
Novel arguments were offered, in Horn v. City of Chicago,
to establish the proposition that there could be no valid bar to a
suit brought to recover damages suffered by a property owner as
a consequence of the making of a public improvement or, if there
was an applicable period of limitation, that the property owner
had at least ten years in which to sue. The first argument proceeded on the theory that a constitutional guarantee for the payment of just compensation 32 could not be rendered nugatory by
any legislative enactment designed to place a limitation on the
time within which proceedings to secure such compensation might
be brought. The second was based on the proposition that the constitution was a form of "written contract" within the meaning
of Section 16 of the Limitation Act. 33 Neither argument prevailed, 34 for the court dismissed the suit on the ground the action,
being one for "injury done to property," should have been instituted within five years.3 5

A tremendously important holding on an obscure question of
limitation has also been achieved by the action of the Supreme
Court in affirming the decision in Wilson v. Tromly.3 It was
there pointed out, apparently for the first time anywhere in the
United States, that a counterclaim for wrongful death, although
filed in apt time under Rule 8 of the Supreme Court, 37 is nevertheless to be regarded as barred by the one-year limitation fixed on
such actions3" if the same is not filed within the stated period from
31403 Ill. 549, 87 N. E. (2d) 642 (1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 940, 94 L. Ed. 580,
70 S. Ct. 429 (1950).
32 Il. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.
33 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2. Ch. 83, § 17.
.34 The first was denied on the authority of Burrill v. Locomobile Co., 258 U. S.
34, 42 S. Ct. 256, 66 L. Ed. 450 (1922). The second was not specifically answered,
the court being content to say: "Neither are we of the opinion that appellant's
The social compact theory
case is aided by section 16 of the Limitations Act ....
of constitutional government was not, apparently, being repudiated, for that section
relates to bonds, notes, bills of exchange, leases, contracts, and "other evidences of
indebtedness."
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16. See also Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v.
City of Rockford, 338 Ill. App. 532, 88 N. E. (2d) 95 (1949).
36404 Ill. 307, 89 N. E.

(2d)

22 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

274-5, 38 Ill. B. J. 287, affirming 336 Ill. App. 403, 84 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949), noted
in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvImW 28-9.
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.8(2).
3S Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
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the date of death. The fact that the counterclaimant did not learn
of the pending suit in which the counterclaim was sought to be
offered until after the one-year period had expired was said to
be a matter of no consequence.
Little has been said of significance with respect to the availability of particular legal remedies designed to meet fact situations of recurrent character. One replevin suit is, however, of
interest. In Milhahn v. Sapp, 39 the tenant of a mortgagee who
held a defaulted chattel mortgage on certain farm machinery was
directed, by the mortgagee, to take possession thereof from the
defaulting mortgagor. In order to accomplish this, the tenant
went with his son to the situs of the property and the son, acting
as the servant of his father, actively took charge of the removal
of the machinery and turned the property over to his father.
Thereafter, the mortgagor brought replevin against the son for
a certain steam tractor on the ground the item in question, while
similar in nature to the mortgaged property, was not covered by
the mortgage. Despite the fact that the mortgagor was fully advised as to the foregoing events, he persisted in his suit against
the tenant's son on the theory that he had violated the Replevin
Act by wrongfully taking the property in question. 40 He lost in
the trial court. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to the
Appellate Court for the Third District on the ground that the
remedy lies not so much against the one who, as servant, actually
performs the physical act of taking but rather against the one
in whose behalf the trespass occurs. As replevin will not lie
against one who merely wrongfully withholds as servant for
another, 4 ' nor can be maintained by one whose only interest in
the property is that of a servant holding for another, 42 the court
deemed that symmetry in the law required a like result where the
servant took wrongfully in another's behalf, especially where he
had relinquished possession prior to suit.43 Having decided that
39
40
41
42

338 Ill. App. 12, 86 N. E. (2d) 667 (1949).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 119, § 1.
Alexander v. Boyle, 68 Ill. App. 139 (1896).
Pease v. Ditto, 189 Ill. 456, 59 N. E. 983 (1901).
43 Bishop v. American Preservers' Co., 157 Ill. 284, 41 N. E. 765, 48 Am. St. Rep.
317 (1895).
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the plaintiff was not entitled to have the possession obtained under
the replevin writ confirmed in him, the court was then faced with
a quandary as to what to do insamuch as the defendant, as servant,
was likewise not entitled to have the property restored. It solved
the difficulty by directing the sheriff to return the articles seized
to the place from whence they had been obtained, leaving it to
further action, if necessary, to settle the rights of the mortgagor
against those who might then assert a claim to the property.
One recognized change has also come about in the law relating
to the use of ejectment proceedings, so that it is now possible to
assert an equitable defense, if one exists, in this essentially legal
form of action, 44 but there would seem to be some confusion over
whether the same thing is possible in a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding. 4 5 It was urged, in Bartelstein v. Goodman,46 that inasmuch as it was possible for the tenant to have every advantage
of his equitable defense in the pending forcible detainer proceeding, there was no need for the maintenance of a separate equitable
action to enjoin the prosecution of the law case. The temporary
injunction there granted was, however, affirmed on appeal not
so much because of any doubt of the right to use an equitable
defense but rather because, admitting that possibility, it still did
not serve as a reason to bar a long established equitable right.
The tenant was regarded as having a choice to proceed either by
way of a separate equitable complaint to enjoin the landlord's
suit or by way of an answer raising the equitable matters in the
statutory fashion. Having the choice, no one else could dictate
how the tenant should exercise his election.
The doctrine of election of remedies may also operate to limit
44 See Horner v. Jamieson, 394
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 232.

Il.

222, 68 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946),

noted in 25

45 The abstract opinion in Northern Trust Co. v. Watson. 310 Ii.
App. 263, 33
N. E. (2d) 897 (1941), would seem to indicate that the equitable defense is available. The more recent holding in Winitt v. Winitt, 339 Ill. App. 75, 89 N. E. (2d)
71 (1949), relying on the old decision in St. Louis National Stock Yards v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 102 Ill. 514 (1882), a case decided long prior to the present Civil Practice
Act, would appear to hold otherwise. It should be noted that the Ejectment Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 45, § 50, has a conformity provision slightly different
from the one in the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute, ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11.
46340 Ill. App. 51, 90 N. E. (2d) 796 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KE-NT LAW
REvrgw 376-7.
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the choice of the pleader, for if he has a choice and has chosen to
follow one potential source for recovery he may, thereby, lose the
right to follow another, but inconsistent, course. 47 That doctrine
was relied on, by the defendant in the case of Stewart v. Nathanson,45 as ground for dismissing a suit in equity to enforce the lien
of a judgment which had been entered against the tavern operator
in a dram shop case. The defendant, owner of the building,
charged that the plaintiff had, by dismissing the law suit as to the
building owner and proceeding to judgment against the tavern
proprietor, elected to pursue his remedy against the tavern proprietor only. The court, however, on the authority of Gibbons
v. Cannaven,49 held that the remedies provided by Sections 14 and
15 of the Dram Shop Act 5 0 were not inconsistent with one another,
hence there was no room for any application of the doctrine in
question.5 1
Questions concerning the scope of equitable jurisdiction were
presented in several cases. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Andrews, 5 2 for example, two railroad companies
filed suit against certain attorneys as well as a number of alleged
"chasers" to enjoin the prosecution of a large number of personal
injury actions which had been filed, under the federal Employers'
Liability Act, against the railroads in Chicago courts. It was
shown that the attorneys in question had maintained a wide-spread
system designed to induce injured railroad employees, some of
whom had suffered injuries as far away as California, Arizona,
or New Mexico, to bring suit in Illinois with the expectation that
verdicts would be for greater sums than could be realized in those
states where the accidents occurred. Further inducement ap47

Glezos v. Glezos, 346 111. 96, 178 N. E. 379 (1931).

48 341 Ill. App. 217, 93 N. E. (2d) 154 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
49 393 I1. 376, 66 N. E. (2d) 370, 169 A. L. R. 1190 (1946), noted in 24 CrIcAo-

RmviEw 37. See also the companion case of Gibbons v. Bandt, 75 F.
Supp. 42 (1947).
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, §§ 135-6.
51 The factual circumstances which might underlie the Gibbons case and also the
instant one would seem to suggest that the property owner gains but a hollow
victory if he succeeds in obtaining a dismissal of the law action as to himself.
That victory is one which he might well forego, if for no other reason than to
insure that the judgment entered against the tavern operator is not one obtained
by means of the latter's fraud or indifference.
52338 Ill. App. 552, 88 N. E. (2d) 364 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
KENT LAw
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peared in the fact that the railroads concerned might be more inclined to reach settlements because of the difficulty of summoning
witnesses from far-away places.
The Appellate Court upheld
the award of an injunction against such practices.
In so doing, it recognized that there was no room for the
application of the principle of forum non conveniens for the plaintiffs in the various injury actions were not parties to the injunction case. But the activities of the defendants amounted to
champerty and maintenance and caused the railroads to suffer an
injury which could not be measured in dollars. Lack of precedent
in Illinois or elsewhere was said not to deprive the equity court
of its power to grant relief. The claim that jurisdiction was lacking to enjoin the attorneys from representing their clients, and
that any challenge had to be made before the Supreme Court which
had granted the license to practice law, was answered by the statement that the injunctional order did not serve to disbar the attorneys nor generally restrain them from practicing their profession.
The testing of the validity of zoning ordinances, as well as the
prevention of any violation of such ordinances, by the process of
injunction is a well-recognized matter of equity jurisdiction. It
is not surprising, therefore, to note that in Drueck v. Peterson53
the Appellate Court sustained a decree enjoining a co-operative
housing association from maintaining a small co-operative unit
with a single kitchen in a district which had been zoned for family
residences only. The adverse effect such use had on the value
of the property of plaintiff, a neighbor, was sufficient to justify
the injunction.
There were cases, however, where the equity court refused
to take jurisdiction. A high school teacher, in Eveland v. Board
of Education of Paris Union School District,5' had received a dismissal notice from a competent board of education but sought an
injunction restraining the board from holding a hearing or denying to him his right to the performance of his contract and the
payment of his salary. The petition was grounded on an alle53 340 I1. App. 164, 91 N. E. (2d) 124 (1950).

54 340 Ill. App. 308, 92 N. E. (2d) 182 (1950).

Leave to appeal has been denied.
O'Connor, ., dissented.
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gation that the charges assigned as cause for dismissal were
incorrect and discharge would lead to irreparable damage. The
Appellate Court, reversing the injunction decree, held that the
statutory remedy5 5 available to the teacher offered opportunity
for adequate relief in the absence of a charge of clear abuse of
discretionary powers.
While temporary injunctions are to be issued to preserve the
status quo until the cause can be disposed of on its merits, 56 difficulties are often met with in the application of this rather simple
57
rule. Thus, in Northern Illinois Coal Corporationv. Langneyer,
a coal company alleged in its complaint that access to land owned
by it, on which it desired to begin mining operations, could be
accomplished only by crossing two township highways where
weight limit restrictions were in force. These weight limitations
served to prevent the company from moving its heavy equipment,
absolutely needed in the carrying out of the contemplated operation, over the highways. It claimed that irreparable injury would
occur unless a temporary injunction was issued against the enforcement of the weight limitations. When reversing a decree
granting such injunction, the Appellate Court pointed out that,
at the time of suit, the company's operations had not been started
but were merely contemplated. There was, then, no occasion for
the court to act to preserve the status quo, for that referred to
the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status preceding the pending controversy.
The Appellant Court was not so harsh in its views in Van
Kleeck v. Vente, 58 a case revealing the strange tale of the operation of a combined dance studio and collection agency. Plaintiffs
there were various small-salaried employees who, by allegedly
false and alluring promises, were induced to take dancing lessons
at defendant's studio and to sign cognovit notes for the tuition.
These notes were then assigned to a collection agency, owned and
maintained by the defendant, which agency proceeded to serve
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 24-1 et seq.
56 Biehn v. Tess, 340 Il. App. 140, 91 N. E. (2d) 160 (1950).
57 340 Ill. App. 423, 92 N. E. (2d) 802 (1950).
58340 I1. App. 395, 91 N. E. (2d) 908 (1950).
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demand notices for payment. A temporary injunction restraining
the defendant, pending the determination of the issues, from collecting or attempting to collect on the notes was upheld when the
court found that it was a matter of common knowledge that the
mere receipt of a demand notice by a debtor's employer was often
sufficient to produce a termination of employment, particularly
where the corporate employer had rules designed to save it from
such annoyance. Waiver of bond in favor of the plaintiffs was
justified by reason of the small salaries earned by the plaintiffs.
Injunction practice was also concerned in a case which was
a by-product of the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 9 where racially
restrictive covenants were declared unenforcible by means of
judicial action. In Amschler v. Reinijasz,6 0 a temporary injunction
had been obtained restraining the defendants from violating such
a covenant. The injunction had been obtained at a time when
covenants of that character were deemed to be judicially enforcible.
Following the decision in the Shelley case, the plaintiffs moved
to dismiss the complaint and, on the same day, defendants moved
to dissolve the temporary injunction and presented a suggestion
of damages. The motion to dissolve was overruled while the motion to dismiss the suit was granted. The court later struck the suggestion of damages. That action was affirmed on the ground that
the only authority for assessment of damages, upon the dissolution
of an injunction, was Section 12 of the Injunction Act, 6' one which
permits an award of damages where an injunction is improperly
sought. Prior to the Shelley case, every court of review had sustained racially restrictive covenants on constitutional grounds so
it had come to be a settled rule of law that, when application for
a temporary injunction was made, the trial judge had no alternative but to grant the request. As the injunction had been properly issued at the outset, the subsequent turn of events did not
bring the case within the statute.
A case of first impression, one which has done much to con59 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441 (1948).
60341 I1. App. 262, 93 N. E. (2d) 386 (1950).
61 I. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
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tribute to an understanding of the law in the field of reformation
of instruments, came before the Supreme Court in the suit entitled Reinberg v. Heiby 2 The donor there concerned had two
daughters, the plaintiff and the defendant, who were his only
heirs. He owned two tracts of contiguous land, acquired at different times and of differing size, which he wished to leave to
his daughters, after his death, in equal but independent shares.
He engaged a surveyor to survey and divide the land into two
equal tracts and to provide appropriate legal descriptions for the
two parcels. He then retained an attorney to prepare a trust
agreement and conveyance by which the property could be turned
over to a trustee who was directed thereby to convey, after the
donor's death, one tract to one daughter and the other to the
second child. The attorney did as instructed but, due to a mistake, used the original instead of the new legal descriptions. The
mistake was not discovered until after the donor's death when
the trustee, following the trust agreement, offered to convey the
land in unequal shares to the designated beneficiaries. Plaintiff, offered a deed to the smaller parcel, brought suit for reformation of the trust agreement. The plaintiff won in the lower
court and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
It distinguished the present case from those instances where a
voluntar3 grantee seeks to reform a deed for mistake against
his grantor or anyone claiming through or under the grantor
as heir, devisee, purchaser, creditor, or subsequent grantee. In
those situations, reformation is customarily denied since it would
be manifestly unjust to permit "a grantee who has given neither
a valuable nor a meritorious consideration to enlarge upon the
grantor's bounty against the interest of the donor grantor or
those deriving their title through him.'"' Thus, if a grantor
should intend to convey a tract of land to a voluntary grantee,
yet through mistake of a scrivener, ends up by retaining title to
the tract, the grantee will not be entitled to reformation of the
deed for this would amount to specific performance of an execu62 404 Il. 247, 88 N. E. (2d) 848 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT
278 and 38 Ill. B. J. 285.
63 404 II. 247 at 253, 88 N. E. (2d) 848 at 851.
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tory promise to make a gift. In the instant case, however, the
grantor's interest in the property was not involved. He had divested himself of all interest in the tracts of land. The litigation did not affect his rights but was a contest between the cobeneficiaries under a voluntary trust through which one beneficiary was trying to enrich herself at the expense of the other.
Perpetuation of the mistake by denial of relief would be a clear
violation of the declared intention of the grantor. Equity, therefore, not only had the right but also the duty to reform the instrument.
Some additional light on the nature of a declaratory judgment proceeding 64 has been provided by the dissenting opinion in
the case of Magnusen v. Klemp.6 5 The issue over which the court
divided was whether or not the plaintiff's action for an accounting as to commissions due or to become due was premature, 66 but
in the course of his dissent, Niemeyer, J., noted that a request
for a declaratory judgment would not be proper if the court,
at the time, is lawfully entitled to enter a coercive judgment particularly where the latter would have served, under the principle
of res judicata, to settle future controversies.6 7 It would seem,
therefore, as if the declaratory judgment proceeding is one to
be utilized prior to the advent of actual wrongdoing.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

The relative decline in cases dealing with issues over pleading may be an indication of an understanding and acceptance of
those sections of the Civil Practice Act which deal with what
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1, first enacted in 1945, authorizes the
use of a declaratory judgment proceeding where persons seek only "binding declarations of rights."
65339 Ill. App. 179, 89 N. E. (2d) 533 (1950). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
66 The suit being one in equity, with an additional request for a declaratory
judgment, the majority refused to apply the legal rule that suit may not be instituted prior to maturity of the demand, Ginsburg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 294 Ill. App.
324, 13 N. E. (2d) 792 (1938), but followed the rule in equity: Town of Kaneville
v. Meredith, 361 Ill. 556, 198 N. E. 857 (1935).
67 He relied on the holdings in Newburger v. Lubell, 232 App. Div. 501, 250 N. Y.
S. 363 (1931), affirmed in 257 N. Y. 383, 178 N. E. 669 (1931) : In re Sterrett's
Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 A. 150 (1930) ; and Georgia Industrial Realty Co. v. City
of Chattanooga, 163 Tenn. 435, 43 S. W. (2d) 490 (1931).
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was once a tricky art known to but few practicing lawyers. A
good complaint should, of course, contain a statement of every
fact necessary to round out a complete cause of action. In that
regard, it might be noted that an essential allegation in every
complaint in tort against a municipal corporation is one with
respect to the giving of that notice which is required from every
injured person by the Cities and Villages Act.6 8 A problem
arose, in Kennedy v. City of Chicago,6 9 as to whether a similar
allegation, together with proof thereof, was necessary in cases
based upon claims for injury arising not from general negligence
but because of municipal failure to suppress rioting within the
city limits. 70 The Appellate Court for the First District, by a
process of statutory integration, held that such an allegation
was required. As a consequence it ordered dismissal of the suit
because the complaint, without that allegation, failed to state a
cause of action. A somewhat similar result was attained in
Hayes v. Chicago Transit Authority71 where the notice provision
of the statute creating the transit authority 72 was construed and
held not satisfied by the submission of accident and medical reports offered as the basis for negotiating a settlement, for formal
written notice was deemed to be a prerequisite to suit.
Section 36 of the Civil Practice Act 73 requires that a copy
of every relevant exhibit on which a cause of action is based
should be attached to the complaint or be quoted therein, so as
to make it unnecessary for the defendant to crave oyer thereof,
or else that a sworn explanation be provided in the event such
instrument is not attached because it is inaccessible. The anticipated penalty for failure to comply with this provision would
seem to be that the complaint might be stricken on motion.74 The
68 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11.
69340 Ill.
App. 100, 9. N. E. (2d) 138 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KE-qT LAW
REvIw 380-1.
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 512 et seq., authorizes a civil suit by the
injured person in such cases.
71 340 Ill. App. 375, 92 N. E. (2d) 174 (1950).
72 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch.111%, § 341.
73 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 160.
74 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, provides for use of a motion where a pleading is
"substantially insufficient in law."
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Appellate Court for the First District, however, in Velsicol Corporation v. Hyman,75 intimated that another penalty might exist,
for the court there, in a suit based on an alleged written agreement between the parties, but one which the plaintiff could not
produce and concerning which it had to use secondary evidence,
expressed disbelief in the secondary proof because plaintiff had
failed to support the complaint with an affidavit as to the nonexistence or non-possession of the written contract.
Authority for simplicity in the manner of statement in pleadings should not be mistaken as providing excuse for sloppy work.
The degree of tolerance shown by the Appellate Court for the
First District, over the question of the extent to which variance
between pleading and proof will be permitted, received a deserved rebuke when the Supreme Court, after having granted leave
to appeal, reversed the holding in the case of Central States Cooperatives, Inc. v. Watson Brothers Transportation Company,
Inc. 76 The higher court pointed to a well-established rule that
a party is not entitled to relief on proof without allegation any
more than he is entitled to receive relief on allegation without
proof. The attempt there made to turn an affirmative answer,
which had denied the cause charged by showing that some other
cause existed, into a weapon to be used to the prejudice of the
77
defendant was there refuted.
A word or two of caution is also needed to those preparing
defensive pleadings. It is fundamental law that a person who
files an answer to the merits of the case thereby abandons any
pending motion he may have made to dismiss the suit for failure
to state a cause of action for he is to be regarded as having ad75338 Il1. App. 52, 87 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949). The decision was subsequently reversed on other grounds: 405 Ill. 352, 90 N. E. (2d) 717 (1950), cert. den. 339 U. S.
966, 70 S. Ct. 1002, 94 L. Ed. 914 (1950).
76 404 Ill. 566, 90 N. E. (2d) 209 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
276-7, reversing 336 Il. App. 314, 83 N. E. (2d) 752 (1949).
77 A follow-up to the proposition may be seen in the case of McFarland v. Town
of Bourbonnais, 339 Ill. App. 328, 89 N. E. (2d) 849 (1950), where the Appellate
Court for the Second District reversed a judgment for a plaintiff who had sued
to recover a salary due for a particular year of service but -whose proof showed
he was entitled only to a lesser sum by way of balance for that year. The fact
that this balance, when added to a sum due for a previous year not mentioned in
the complaint, equalled the amount for which judgment had been granted, was held
inadequate reason for affirming the judgment.
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mitted his motion was unsound and to have acknowledged that
78
If
the complaint was sufficient in law to require an answer.
he should, on a later occasion, decide to renew his motion, he
should first obtain permission to withdraw the answer so filed
and then, apparently, refile the original motion in written form
with full specification of the defects relied upon. 70 Failure to
observe these requirements led the Appellate Court, in Lederer
v. St. Clair Hotel, Inc., ° to reverse a decree dismissing a suit
on motion for the reason that to permit such decree to stand would
result in creating a "far-reaching and dangerous precedent."
Defendant's claim that plaintiff had acquiesced in an oral renewal of a motion to dismiss, while the answer still remained in
the case, was rejected on the ground that counsel for defendant,
and the chancellor, should have known the oral motion was insufficient and that the attempt to bring about dismissal in that
fashion was a "quick and easy method" for disposition which the
chancellor should not have approved. An analogous situation
exists where the plaintiff, after a motion to strike the answer
has been denied, proceeds to file a reply challenging the existence of the facts alleged in the answer. Having joined issue,
the plaintiff is not, according to City of Naperville v. Steininger,1l
entitled to urge the insufficiency of the defense set forth in the
answer, on appeal from an adverse decision, for he is deemed to
have agreed, by his course of action, that the answer, if true,
8 2
constituted a sufficient defense.
Issues relating to proper parties are seldom raised. Mention was made last year, however, of a tendency to develop a system of third-party practice, 3 either from an evident misconstruction of the provision for the addition of new parties8 4 or because
78 Bransfield v. Bransfield, 310 I1. App. 394, 34 N. E. (2d) 83 (1941), abst. opinion;
Sheehy v. Koerber, 282 Ill. App. 543 (1935).
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, requires that the motion "shall point
out specifically the defects complained of."
80 339 inl. App. 214, 89 N. E. (2d) 739 (1949).
81339 Ill. App. 294, 89 N. E. (2d) 840 (1950), noted in 38 Iln. B. J. 509.
82 The former practice is illustrated In Garden City Sand Co. v. Christley, 289
Ill. 617, 124 N. E. 729 (1919).
83 See 28 CmCAGo-KENT LAW REvrEw 33.
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149, authorizes the bringing in of new

parties "where a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had," but
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of an unconscious oversight which has not yet been subjected to
questioning. Further illustration thereof may be seen in the
case of Hillman v. Kropp Forge Company85 wherein a defendant, by counterclaim, brought in a person who was not a party
to the suit, and against whom the plaintiff desired no relief, on
the theory that if defendant owed an obligation to the plaintiff
then such defendant would have a law action over against the
counter-defendant so added. The attempt failed, not so much
because of any procedural objection, for none was advanced,
but because of the requirements of substantive law. If thirdparty practice is to be encouraged, it should be regularized by
proper statutory amendment or addition.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE,

Assurance that the litigant shall have that "fair" trial which
is guaranteed to him by the constitution is provided by statutory
provisions for change of venue and for challenge to prospective
jurors. One reason for seeking, and receiving, change of venue
is that personal prejudice exists on the part of the trial judge.8 6
It is a rare case, however, wherein wholesale prejudice is likely
to exist without there being some specific evidence to which reference could be made. It was for that reason that the Supreme
Court, in Balaszek v. Blaszak,.7 while noting there was no direct authority requiring any specification of the ground of prejudice, thought it unusual to have an application made for a change
of venue directed against a number of judges without such specification. The court designated the practice as one which did not
appeal to the judges of the higher court. The comment so made
may foreshadow a tightening up of the practice relating to applications for change of venue.
On the subject of peremptory challenges addressed to prosit is thought to be a codification of the former equity practice: Ill. Civ. Prac. Act
Anno. 1933, pp. 51-2. It is not comparable to Rule 14 of the District Courts of the
United States: 28 U. S. C. A., Rule 14.
85340 Ill. App. 606, 92 N. E. (2d) 537 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, § 1.
87405 Ill. 36, 89 N. E. (2d) 796 (1950).
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pective jurors, construction of the statute placing limits on the
right to so challenge"8 has occurred before but never to the comprehensive degree that may be noted in Curtis v. Lowe.8 9 The
court there laid down certain propositions which should clarify
trial practice. In the first place, the court said the statutory
phrase "each party" really means "each side," and this is true
even though two or more persons on the "same side" have, or
claim to have, conflicting or hostile interests, as might be the
case where several tort-feasors are combined as defendants. Second, although "each side" of the civil suit is entitled to a minimum of five peremptory challenges, three additional peremptory
challenges are allowed for each additional party defendant or
party plaintiff. The total number is not reached by adding together all litigants in the case but is calculated on the basis of
the number involved on one side or the other, whichever is greater.
Third, once that number has been determined, the product is to
be applied uniformly to both sides so that each side of the case
may have an equal number of peremptory challenges to distribute
in any manner that may be agreed upon. If no agreement can be
reached, a distribution of the allotted challenges among the several parties on the one side in a manner determined by the trial
judge will be approved unless there is a clear abuse of the discretionary power.
Avoidance of the effect of a trial, even while it is in progress,
may sometimes occur by dismissal or nonsuit of the action. In
that regard, the control which a plaintiff once exercised over
litigation, particularly with respect to its dismissal, has been
severely limited by the enactment of Section 52 of the Civil Practice Act, 90 but not until the holding in Glick v. Glick91 did it become apparent that the limitations imposed by the statute relate
not only to the action itself but also to any aspect thereof. The
plaintiff there, in 1945, had secured a divorce, a property settle§ 148(8).
Ill. App. 463, 87 N. E. (2d) 865 (1949), noted in 38 Ill. B.
appeal has been denied.
88 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2. Ch. 110,
89 338

90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch.
91 338 Ill. App. 637, 88 N. E. (2d)

110, § 176.
509 (1949).

J.

516. Leave to
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ment, and custody of the child of the parties. In 1948, she moved
to have the settlement set aside on the ground of a subsequent
enhancement in the ex-husband's wealth as well as to secure an
increase in the amount payable for the child's support. The
first prayer was dismissed on motion, 92 and the second was taken
under advisement. While the matter was so pending, defendant
obtained an order for visitation and went to California, where
the child was then living, to see the child. Plaintiff there caused
process to be served on defendant in certain suits begun under the California law to accomplish all that had been attempted
in Illinois. Defendant, upon his return, filed a counter-petition
in the Illinois proceedings to secure injunctive relief against the
prosecution of the California cases. Thereupon, plaintiff sought
to dismiss her Illinois petition and withdraw herself from the
jurisdiction, but both the trial and the Appellate Court held the
request came too late in the absence of any stipulation or the
showing of any adequate cause.
Dismissal for want of prosecution, on the other hand, is
usually granted only when it appears that counsel's application
for a continuance is offered solely with intent to delay the administration of justice. It was, therefore, considered to be error,
in Adcock v. Adcock, 93 to dismiss the suit after counsel, by appropriate affidavit, had shown he was engaged in the trial of an
emergency proceeding and could not meet the trial date which had
been set therein. The fact that such date had been set by agreement between court and counsel was said not to prevent the trial
court from exercising a sound discretion as to the granting of an
94
additional continuance.
The only evidence problem of significance, one dealing with
the competency of a witness, arose in Sankey v. Interstate Dispatch, Inc.9 That was a suit for wrongful death brought by an
92 While not so stated, the court apparently acted in reliance on the holding in
Arnold v. Arnold, 332 Ill. App. 586, 76 N. E. (2d) 335 (1947). noted in 26 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvlEw 344-8.
93339 Ill. App. 543, 91 N. E. (2d) 99 (1950).
94 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 183 and § 259.14.
95339 Ill. App. 420, 90 N. E. (2d) 265 (19-50), noted in 28 (HIAoo-KET LAW
REVIEW 384. Leave to appeal has been denied.
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administrator against the owner of a truck and the truck driver.
The latter was not served with process and did not appear until
called as a witness on behalf of the truck owner. The Appellate
Court for the First District held that he was not a "party" to
the action within the contemplation of the so-called "dead man's"
statute,9" hence was competent to testify. No cases directly in
point on the exact facts could be found, but the court had no
difficulty in finding analogous cases. 9 7 It also measured the classification of the driver by a reference to Greenleaf's work on
evidence9" and concluded that he did not fit the definition there
propounded, although a successful attempt to serve him with
summons would have made him a party. A claim that the driver
was an incompetent person because directly interested in the suit
was readily disposed of, and denied, by reference to many earlier
cases and the decision in Feith v. Chicago City Railway Company9"
in particular.
After the verdict has been received, there may be occasion
to present a motion for a new trial. Section 68 of the Civil
Practice Act' provides, in that connection, that the moving party
shall file his points in writing and shall particularly specify
the grounds for such motion. No opinion of the Supreme Court
bearing directly on the point of the degree of elaborateness of
specification which should be present has been announced to date,
but there is some disagreement over the construction which should
be placed on the rule in the different appellate districts. 2 Lawyers
trying cases in the First District should give heed to the case
of Pajak v. Mamsch,3 for the Appellate Court there served warning that it would hereafter require every motion for a new trial
1, Ch. 51, § 2.
97 Willard v. Zehr, 215 111. 148, 74 N. E. 107 (1905); -Webb v. Willet Co., 309 I1.
App. 504, 33 N. E. (2d) 636 (1941).
9s Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, § 535, states: "Parties in the larger legal sense,
are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to
adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision, if any appeal
lies."
99 211 Ill. 279, 71 N. E. 991 (1904).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 192(l).
2 Compare Baker v. Thompson, 337 Ill. App. 327, 85 N. E. (2d) 924 (1949), with
Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill.
App. 337, 87 N. E. (2d) 147 (1949).
3338 Ill. App. 337, 87 N. E. (2d) 147 (1949), noted in 38 111. B. J. 148.
96 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol.
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to be in writing and to contain particular specification if error
is to be assigned for the denial thereof. General specification such
as the one there used, a specification to the effect that the court
"erred in giving and reading instructions to the jury" which had
been tendered by the opponent, was condemned as inadequate.
4
Prior warning had been given in Krug v. Armour & Company
but, despite the fact that leave to appeal was denied therein, the
local bar seems to have persisted in the belief that the "shotgun" assignment of error was a time-honored labor-saving device
which sufficiently met statutory requirements. The court, in the
Pajak case, spread on its records what had hitherto been an unreported sequence of events growing out of the Krug case, so
that all might read and profit thereby. At the same time, it announced the importance which it would hereafter attach to a fair
compliance with its understanding of the statutory purpose.
Sharpness and clarity in the reasons assigned as ground for a
new trial, to the point of singling out the truly objectionable instructions by number or description and noting the precise objection thereto, not only seems to be in accord with the spirit
of Section 68 but should also result in a genuine saving of judicial time.
A question arose, in Hughes v. Bandy,5 as to whether or not a
trial judge might add a sum of money to the amount fixed by the
jury in their verdict. The case was one of suit and counter-suit
wherein the jury had fixed plaintiff's damages in the sum of
$615.00 whereas the undisputed amount of damage was $1218.25.
Both parties, in due time, made separate motions for a directed
verdict and both motions were quite prgoperly denied. Plaintiff
then moved for judgment in the larger amount notwithstanding
the verdict. This request was granted. Neither party had filed
an alternative motion for a new trial. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded with instruction to enter judgment on the
verdict. Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was affirmed.
4335 Il. App. 222, 80 N. E. (2d) 386 (1948). abst. opin.
5 404 II. 74. 87 N. E. (2d) 8-55 (1949), noted in 38 Il1. B. J. 232, affirming 336 Il1.
App. 472. 84 N. E. (2d) 664 (1949).
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It was clear error on the part of the trial court to allow an
additur on plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for, by such motion, the trial court was limited to the
single question of whether or not there was evidence to support
the defense. What plaintiff sought was correction in the amount
of the verdict, not a redetermination of the question of liability.
Under Supreme Court Rule 22, and the construction placed upon
it,6 the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to
be used only where it would have been the duty of the court to
direct a verdict in the first instance. Plaintiff, more nearly, should
have moved to have the verdict set aside and to secure a new
trial. Although Section 92 of the Civil Practice Act 7 permits a
reviewing court to remand for a partial new trial, which remand
may be limited to the question of damages," the defendant's position in the case would probably have been prejudiced by such a
limited order. The question of liability seemed to be a close one
and the inadequate amount of damages fixed by the jury probably represented a compromise on the prime issue. The final
outcome, therefore, might be said to represent a reasonable solution to the problem.
In direct opposition to the preceding case is the problem
which arises when the amount of damazes stated in the verdict
is so excessive as to furnish ground for a motion to set the verdict aside. The trial judge in such a situation may order a new
trial unless the plaintiff will file a remittur releasing the excess
amount.9 It should be noted, however, that the theory underlying the use of a remittur is that the successful party is willing
to surrender the excessive portion of the award 0 for there would
be grave constitutional doubt of interference with the right of
trial by jury if the trial court were empowered to force surrender
of a portion of the established demand." For these reasons, the
2, Ch. 110, § 259.22.
Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216.
S Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 379 Il1. 504, 41 N. E. (2d) 508 (1942).
9 See the discussion of this point in North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. IVrixen, 150 I1.
532, 37 N. E. 895 (1894).
10 He indicates such willingness by filing a statement to that effect: Sandy v.
Lake Street Elevated R. Co., 258 Ill. 75, 101 N. E. 211 (1913).
11 The constitutional arguments are discussed in McCormick, Handbook on the
Law of Damages (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1935). pp. 76-82.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol.
7
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Appellate Court for the First District reversed the judgment
rendered in Augustine v. Kaufman,1" for the trial judge had there
ordered plaintiff to remit part of the demand. As the court could
not tell, from the record, whether the defendant would wish to
move for a new trial 3 or whether plaintiff would willingly waive
the seemingly excessive amount, it was unable to enter a proper
judgment 14 and was obliged to remand the case for further proceedings.
It might also be well to note that the ad damnum clause in a
complaint at law is not a useless appendage. In default cases,
it may well fix the maximum possible recovery, 5 while in other
situations it may aid in a determination of whether or not a given
court has jurisdiction to entertain the cause. 6 A party is not,
however, bound by the original statement as to the amount of
his damages for he may, on proper motion, amend this portion
of his complaint,' 7 just as is true of any other part thereof, 8 in
order to get the benefit of a verdict for a higher figure. The
holding in Curtis v. City of Chicago'9 in no way contradicts the
law on the subject, but it does add emphasis to the fact that the
record should show that such amendment did, in fact, occur for
the court there reduced the judgment to the amount originally requested as the appellate record failed to bear out the claim
that an oral request for permission to amend the ad damnun
clause to meet the terms of the verdict had been granted.
12 338 Ill.
App. 591, 88 N. E. (2d) 378 (1949).
13 The defendant had not participated in the appeal as appellee, seemingly being
content to have a judgment for the smaller amount affirmed, if such should be the
case.
14 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216(e), purports to authorize the reviewing court to give "any judgment and make any order which ought to have been
given or made."
15 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 158.
1; See Redwing v. Moncravie, 131 Cal. App. 569, 21 P. (2d) 986 (1933), to the
effect that the court does not lose jurisdiction because of an excessive demand,
but it must, necessarily, limit the judgment to the jurisdictional amount.
17 There would appear to be a limit on the right of amendment to increase the
ad damnum in wrongful death cases, if the attempt is made to enhance the damages
under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70. § 2, as amended in 1947, in cases occurring
before the date of the amendment: Theodosis v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341
Ill. App. 8, 92 N. E. (2d) 794 (1950). See also 27 CnICAGO-KENT T.AW REVIEW -41.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170.
) 3.9 ill. App. 61. 89 N. E. (2d) 63 (1949).
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Elements of damage law were concerned in a few noteworthy
cases. It might be appropriate to mention, first, that the views
expressed in Aldridge v. Morris,20 noted last year, a case concerning the right of one tort feasor to have the benefit, by way of reduction in damages, of sums paid by another tort feasor for a
covenant not to sue, appear to be taking hold. Both the Appellate
Court for the First District, in Curtis v. City of Chicago,2 ' and
for the Third District, in New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad
Company v. American Transit Lines, Inc.,22 have now approved
judicial action in reducing the judgments there rendered below
the amount of the verdict by a sum equal to that received as
consideration for the covenant not to sue. Both courts referred
to the Aldridge case as authority for the proposition that the
injured plaintiff is entitled to no more than one recovery for a
single wrong.
The next case reveals that the first state court attempt to
enforce the rule of Daily v. Parker,2 3 one dealing with the right
of a child to recover damages for the alienation of the parent's
affections, appears to have collapsed with the ultimate outcome of
the case of Johnson v. Luhman.24 A verdict and judgment for the
defendant was there affirmed despite some criticism as to the
exclusion of evidence and the refusal to give desired instructions.
If the case indicates anything, it does serve as a warning that
punitive damages may not be assessed in such cases until there
is some evidence, of more than speculative character, that actual
25
loss has been sustained.
Three cases illustrate legal limits which may be placed on
the measure of recovery. The classic rule for fixing the damage
20337 Ill. App. 369, S6 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949). noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT L.AW
REVIEW 313. Leave to appeal denied.
21339 Ill. App. 61, 89 N. E. (2d) 63 (1949).
22 339 Ill. App. 282, 89 N. E. (2d) 858 (1950). Leave to appeal has been granted.
(2d) 174 (1945), criticized in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 90.
24 340 Ill. App. 625, 92 N. E. (2d) 486 (1950). The complaint had been sustained
2a 152 F.

in 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. (2d)

810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW 260.

25 But see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 34, and § 41, as to the possibility of
recovering punitive damages in cases brought by the spouse.
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suffered by the conversion of personal property is said to be one
calling for the "market value" thereof at the time of conversion, but it is not always easy to fix upon that figure. In Sachs
v. American Bonding Company of Baltimore,2 for example, the
plaintiff, a dealer in beauty supplies, had failed to secure the
return of his stock of goods after an unjustified attempt had been
made to replevy the same from him. He sued for the value of the
property not returned, claiming to be entitled to a figure based
on the resale value, set at a price customarily charged by dealers
to users of like products. That price would have allowed for a
margin of profit over and above the original cost, but plaintiff
offered no evidence to establish that he had negotiated for sales
of the goods or that he even had any prospective purchasers. He
was, therefore, limited to the replacement cost as that figure was
deemed to furnish the best evidence of market value.
In actions against bailees to recover for damage done by
reason of the destruction of bailed articles, it becomes important
to establish the worth of the property so destroyed. In one such
suit, over a bailed automobile, the parties stipulated that if an
absent witness had been present he would have testified that the
"Blue Book" value of an automobile of the type in question would
have ranged between two figures agreed upon. The stipulation
further recited that the so-called "Blue Book" was a book used
by all motor vehicle companies in estimating the values of cars.
The reviewing court, in Brown v. Welborn,2 7 affirmed a judgment
based on such stipulation, not so much because it approved the
same as a basis for calculating damages but rather because the
actual award fixed by the trial court was below the minimum
figure set thereby, hence the defendant was in no position to
complain of an error which redounded to his favor. 28 As the
normal measure of recovery in destruction cases is the value of
the property at the time of destruction, 29 but such fact is not
26 340 Ill. App. 564, 92 N. E. (2d) 510 (1950).
27 338 Ill. App. 507, 88 N. E. (2d) 104 (1949).
28 The court, in fact, said: ". . . the appellee's proof of damages leaves something

to be desired." See 338 Ill. App. 507 at 513, 88 N. E. (2d) 104 at 107.
29 Bailey v. Ford, 151 Md. 664, 135 A. 835 (1927), used that standard in an automobile case. See also Sturges v. Keith, 57 Ill. 451, 11 Am. Rep. 28 (1870).
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always easy to demonstrate, the use of circumstantial evidence
developed by reference to accepted trade or similar lists has
become a fairly acceptable substitute.3 0 The widespread use of
the so-called "Blue Book" in the automobile field would seem
to offer some basis for the belief that it should serve as a useful
device for measuring value, although it would otherwise be objectionable as hearsay.
Personal injury cases frequently require the translation into
monetary amounts of such imponderable things as present and
prospective loss of health, pain, suffering and the like growing
out of the wrong done. When a minor child sues for personal injury there is some doubt whether the jury may also consider, as
an element of damage, the sums expended or to be expended by
the parent for medical treatment or the loss of potential earning power during the period of minority. These losses would
seem to accrue to the parent who well might maintain an independent action for the recovery thereof. It has, however, been
held that if the parent sues as next friend for the minor and
claims such items as elements of damage in the minor's case, he
is then estopped from thereafter pursuing any further remedy.3 1
To avoid any question on the point, the parent in Romine v. City
of Watseka,32 gave a formal written assignment of such claims
to the child's guardian who brought suit on the child's behalf.
That act gave the defendant cause to complain that it was error
to exclude proof of the parent's contributory negligence, which
had aided in producing the injury, for it was argued that the
assignee must necessarily take the claim subject to all defenses
existing between the original parties. The court declined to
agree, preferring to hold that the minor was not suing as assignee
but rather was proceeding in his own right, for emancipation operated not so much to transfer prior property rights as it did to
release former obligations.
Fundamental law forbids the splitting of a cause of action
30 See McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages (West. Pub. Co., St. Paul,
1935), pp. 175-81.
.11 American Car & Foundry Co. v. Hill. 226 Il. 227, 80 N. E. 784 (1907).
'32 341 Ill.' App. 370, 91 N. E. (2d) 76 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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under penalty of loss of all damage not claimed in the original
action. For that reason, the use of a separate proceeding to
recover expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defending litigation, which subsequent events show should not have been
brought, is usually not permitted, either because the recovery
thereof should have been obtained in the original action 33 or because there is a public policy against such claims, one based on
the belief that it is better to allow recourse to the courts than
to stifle the maintenance of misguided suits by threat of heavy
penalty.34 That rule, of course, is not followed when it can be
shown that the prior litigation was maliciously conducted, for a
clear remedy exists, in tort, against those who engage in unwarranted malicious prosecutions or who invoke malicious abuses of
process. 3 5 The case of Skelly Oil Company v. Universal Oil Products Company,"U however, excites interest for the basis of the
action there begun to recover fees and expenses was not that the
prior litigation had been maliciously instituted but that the successful plaintiff, defendant herein, had later been shown to have
succeeded in the earlier case by reason of having corruptly bribed
a judge of a United States Court of Appeals to decide the appeal in its favor. The action was, to some extent, based on fraud
and deceit, but of a dissimilar and more enormous type than
that sometimes perpetrated.3 7 The fact that it was impossible to
catalog the action did not deter the majority of the Appellate
Court for the First District from reversing a judgment which
had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It considered the case to be one falling within the constitutional mandate that every person "ought to find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may
receive in his person, property, or reputation," s and, on that
33 See cases cited In annotation in 39 A. L. R. 1218.
34 Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N. E. (2d) 41 (1943).
35 Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289, 11 Am. Rep. 10 (1870).
36338 Ill. App. 79, 86 N. E. (2d) 875 (1949), noted in 50 Col. L. Rev. 103, 38 Ill.
B. J. 189. Niemeyer, J., dissented in part. See also Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v.
American Safety Table Co., 88 F. Supp. 260 (1949).
37 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238. 64 S. Ct. 997,
88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944).
3S 11. Const. 1870, Art. IT, § 19.
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basis, deemed it proper that a court should find a remedy against
the type of fraud which had been perpetrated. If the suit had
simply been one to secure restitution of the money which had been
paid to the defendant, there would be little occasion to quarrel
with the outcome of the case. There is occasion to doubt, however, that the court should have used the constitutional phrase3 9
ology to develop a remedy not previously known to exist.
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Before proceeding with an examination of decisions concerning the right to appeal from trial court judgments and decrees, it
is worth noting that some relief from erroneous decisions may be
accomplished in the trial court by way of a motion under Section
72 of the Civil Practice Act. 40 Since it is a form of appeal, there
should be no surprise over the fact that many of the rules relating to appeal and appellate procedure should be applicable to
such a motion. One such rule provides that there can be no review of a judgment or decree which has been entered by the consent of the parties. 41 That principle has now been applied, in
Lefer v. Jones, 42 to a motion to vacate a former judgment filed
in accordance with Section 72. It appeared, in that case, that the
earlier judgment had been entered by "agreement between the
parties hereto made in open court." An order setting the consent judgment aside was reversed on the ground the court lacked
jurisdiction to review the original proceedings.
That doctrine does not carry over to cases in which the state
is an interested party, according to Massell v. Daley, 4 8 for the
consent decree there previously entered was held properly vacated on the ground that no public official can effectively waive the
right of the state to seek review of an adverse determination.
39 See Heindl, "A Remedy for All Injuries?", 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw
90-100.
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
41 Sims v. Powell, 390 Ill. 610, 62 N. E. (2d) 456 (1945). In City of Kankakee v.
Lang, 323 Ill. App. 14. 54 N. E. (2d) 605 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvrEw 25, an "O.K.'d" order was deemed to fall in this category.
42 338 Ill. App. 173, 87 N. E. (2d) 48 (1949).
43 404 Ill. 479, 89 N. E. (2d) 361 (1950), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 289.
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But, in Nelson v. Nelson,4 4 a majority of the justices of the Appellate Court for the First District applied much the same rule
to a case wherein the "approved" decree effected a compromise,
between the parents, of the obligation to provide for the support
of a child. As the fundamental agreement was deemed #oid because of a public policy forbidding release of the duty to support, 45 it was held that there could be no such thing as a "consent" decree operating to relieve one of the burden.
If an appeal is sought, the attorney should be watchful of
the fact that limitations do exist on the jurisdiction of reviewing
tribunals. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain
a direct appeal, in real property cases, for example, is limited
to those situations wherein a freehold is directly involved. 46 In
two prior cases, 47 that court had entertained direct appeals in
suits involving the riparian rights of land owners, particularly
with respect to stream pollution, on the theory that the right to a
stream of water was "as sacred as a right to the soil over which
it flows."148 On further reflection, the court held, in Clark v. Lindsay Light & Chemical Company,49 that since such riparian waters are not technically susceptible of absolute ownership, as
would be true of the soil, direct appeal to the Supreme Court was
improper. The case was, therefore, transferred to the appropriate Appellate Court.5 0
It should next be remembered that appeals typically lie only
from final orders, judgments or decrees. Any liberality which
may have been displayed, in conformity with the spirit underlying the Civil Practice Act, 51 respecting the finality of a trial court
44 340 Il. App. 463, 92 N. E. (2d) 534 (1950). Burke, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
45 Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N. E. (2d) 344 (1937).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
47 See Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191
N. E. 239 (1934) ; City of Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402, 68 N. E. 388 (1903).
48 City of Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402 at 417, 68 N. E. 388 at 393.
49405 Ill. 139, 89 N. E. 900 (1950).
50 The judgment of the trial court was affirmed after transfer of the cause: 341
Ill. App. 316, 93 N. E. (2d) 441 (1950).
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 128.
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judgment as condition precedent to an appeal therefrom5 2 would
seem to have been withdrawn under the holding in Anderson v.
Sainuelson.53 After verdict for the defendant therein and denial
of a motion for a new trial, the trial judge entered judgment
to the effect that the defendant should recover his costs and that
execution should issue therefor. The judgment order did not contain any phrase to the effect that the plaintiff should "take
nothing by his suit" or that the defendant should "go hence
without day." The reviewing court, on its own motion, decided
the judgment was not one calling for final disposition of the
case and dismissed the appeal. 54 It is true that the trial judge
could have found a better expression to indicate his intention and
purpose to dismiss the suit, but slavish regard for old forms
hardly comports with the spirit of modern procedure, nor is litigation "speedily and finally determined" by holdings such as the
one in this case.
Where review of interlocutory orders is permitted, such as in
the case of the granting of a temporary injunction, 55 the scope
of the review is generally confined to an examination into the exercise of discretion in the entry of such order, but would necessarily include an examination into the sufficiency of the complaint
to determine whether it would support any order. 56 The case of
Biehn v. Tess 57 introduced a novel point for the defendant there
concerned had, prior to an appeal from an interlocutory order
granting a temporary injunction, first moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, when that motion had been overruled, had then answered as to the merits. At
the ensuing appeal from the interlocutory order, plaintiff desired
52 See, in particular, Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Il1.
569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), noted in 22 CICAGO-KENT LAW Ravnw 207, and
Gould v. Klabunde, 326 Ill. App. 643, 63 N. E. (2d) 258 (1945).
53 340 Ill. App. 528, 92 N. E. (2d) 343 (1950).
It is worthy of note that Justice
Dove, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Gould v. Klabunde, 326 Ill. App. 643,
63 N. E. (2d) 258 (1945), now appears to have convinced the other justices of the
Appellate Court for the Second District to follow his view on the point.
54 It is admitted that the jurisdiction of a reviewing court is generally limited to
appeals from "final" orders: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201.
55 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
56 Baird v. Community High School Dist. No. 168, 304 Ill. 526, 136 N. E. 671
(1922).
37840I11. App. 140, 91 N. E. (2d) 160 (1950).
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to limit appellate consideration to the sole question of the
proper exercise of discretion on the theory that the defendant, by
answering, had admitted the sufficiency of the complaint and
could not, therefore, urge its insufficiency for the purpose of undermining the interlocutory order. The Appellate Court, nevertheless, examined into the sufficiency of the complaint, taken by
itself, disregarded the course of pleading in the trial court, and
finding the complaint to be defective then ordered the temporary injunction set aside.
A few points have also been made concerning procedure on
appeal. No appeal operates as a supersedeas unless, and until,
the appellant provides bond pursuant to Section 82 of the Civil
Practice Act, 58 but no distinction is there made between a bond
simply to cover the cost of appeal and one intended to insure
the payment of the judgment or decree in case the same is affirmed, for the only requirement is that the bond be "in a reasonable amount to secure the adverse party."
Naturally, once
bond is provided, no action may be taken to carry the judgment or decree into effect nor may the expenses of suit be enhanced by any action taken thereunder.5 9 It was urged, in Ilarrison v. Kamp,6" that a difference, in fact, did exist between a bond
for costs and one given to secure payment, so that expenses incurred after an appeal had been taken were properly chargeable
as costs, when only the former type of bond had been used, because supersedeas had not then become effective.
The argument was seemingly reinforced by the fact that the appellant,
having provided a nominal bond in the trial court, later applied
to the Supreme Court for a writ of supersedeas to prevent sale
of the real estate in question and was there, as a condition to the
issuance of such writ, obliged to give a much more substantial
5s Ii1.

Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 206.
is not accurate as to a judgment or decree which is selfexecuting. In Gumberts v. East Oak Street Hotel Co., 404 111. 386, 88 N. E. (2d)
883 (1949), the Supreme Court noted that the appeal there taken from a decree
dismissing a complaint, even after bond had been provided, did not operate to stay
the power of the appellee to sell the property in question for, after dismissal,
there were no further proceedings to be stayed, except perhaps those relating to
enforcement of a judgment for costs.
(;o 403 Ill. 542, 87 N. E. (2d) 631 (1949). reversing 335 Il1. App. 260, 81 N. E. (2d)
754 (1948).
59 This statement
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bond. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, decided that the trial
court lost all jurisdiction as soon as a bond, in any amount, had
been approved and that the decree creditor should have attacked
the sufficiency thereof before attempting to enforce the decree.
The extra expense incurred was, therefore, disallowed.
Due observance of time limitations on the right to appeal is
essential, for an untimely appeal may well be dismissed, either
on motion or by the reviewing court without any motion. Disparity, of course, exists in the manner of measuring the operation of the time limit in law cases when contrasted with equity
proceedings because of an intrinsic difference in the manner of
rendering a binding final decision. The law judgment becomes
final, and the time for appeal begins to run, from the moment
the judgment is uttered.6 1 By contrast, the equity decree takes
effect only after it has been reduced to writing, has been signed
by the chancellor, and has been filed for enrolling with the clerk
of the court. 2 In either event, according to Jones v. City of Carterville,63 the date shown on the appellate record for the entry
or enrolling of the decision controls the period for permissible
appeal and the court will not permit extraneous matters to en64
large that time.
Along that same line, it should be noted that there is a
spread of ten days between the time when the appellant should
file the report of the trial proceedings in the lower court"
and the time when the same should be transmitted to the
reviewing tribunal6 6 That ten-day lag was sufficient, in Kohn
v. Kohn,67 to save an appeal from a motion to dismiss. The
appellant had, within the time fixed by law, obtained an ex61 Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Ashelford, 268 Ill. 87, 108 N. E. 761 (1915).
62 Snook v. Shaw, 315 Ill. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 98.

63 340 Ill. App. 330, 91 N. E. (2d) 604 (1950).
64 The facts indicated that the record showed entry of the decree on May 3rd,
although the clerk certified that the decree had not been received by him until
July 28th. An appeal taken on October 10th, more than ninety days after May 3rd
but well within the period if the same was to be measured from July 28th, was
ordered dismissed on the state of the record. There was intimation that if an
effort had been made to correct the record, the appeal might have been saved.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.36(1) (c).
66 Ibid., § 259.36(2) (a).
67 337 Ill. App. 391, 86 N. E. (2d) 833 (1949).
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tension of time from the trial court within which to file the
trial report. Prior to the expiration thereof, and on stipulation,
the appellant secured an additional extension from the reviewing
court, which court fixed a precise day for the filing. The trial
record was filed below on the day named but did not reach the
reviewing court until some eight days later. It was held that the
appeal had been properly taken for the rule in question served
to add the ten-day period for transmittal of the record to any
period of extension which might be properly granted.
The appellate record should, of course, be complete in every
respect so that the reviewing tribunal may, if necessary, turn
to it with ease and there find every step taken in the case below.""
In addition, the accompanying abstract of the record should, by
appropriate marginal page numbering, facilitate the work of the
court by making reference to the record a simple matter. 9 It
is not to be wondered, therefore, that a reviewing court should
express displeasure if the appellant has not provided these timesaving devices and even carry that displeasure to the point of
dismissing the appeal. Such was the case in People ex rel. Rose
v. Craig70 where the judgment of the trial court was affirmed
because the appellate record was incomplete and the abstract inadequate to reveal any reversible error. In Jacobs v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,71 however, the attack on the appeal
failed because the alleged omissions in the record arose from the
act of the clerk of the trial court in leaving out the covers of the
various pleadings, etc., on which had appeared the customary
filing data, but the omission had been supplied by a photostatic
copy of the docket sheet which showed the actual dates of filing.
The higher court described the record as "confusing," thereby
intimating that the practice should not be followed hereafter,
but denied the motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground the
original record, plus a proffered additional transcript, adequately
presented questions for review.
68 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.36, specifies the content of the record
on appeal.
69 Ibid., § 259.38.
70404 Ill. 505, 89 N. E. (2d) 409 (1950).
71337 Ii. App. 398, 86 N. E. (2d) 849 (1949).
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ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

A final and unreversed judgment having been obtained, the
issue then becomes one as to the manner of its enforcement. General doctrines have gone unchanged, but three interesting cases
falling in this area have been decided. The first to be noted is
that of Corrigan v. Miller7 2 for there, under a broad application
of Section 78 of the Bulk Sales Law,7 3 it was determined that the
ex-wife of the vendor involved, having secured a judgment against
him for accrued alimony, could successfully levy upon a portion
of the property sold to the vendee, even though such portion constituted only a third of the total business assets of the debtor.
The divorced vendor had been engaged in a combination rubber
tile and marble contracting business which he decided to sell out
to his employees. The particular vendee bought the tile branch
of the business while another purchased the marble branch. The
deals were consummated simultaneously with both buyers knowing of the sale to the other. Together, they constituted a disposition of the total assets of the business.
Seizure of the assets at the instance of the judgment crediupheld, despite the contention advanced by the particuwas
tor
lar vendee that his sale did not come within the compass of the
Bulk Sales Act, because it was said the sale was one of goods
and chattels used by the contractor in his business and because
the purchase did constitute a transfer of a major part of the
vendor's goods. It is well-settled law that the particular nature
or character of the goods is a matter of no moment so long as the
74
items do represent goods and chattels of the vendor's business.
The decision on the second point, however, leaves one in doubt.
Conceded that the statute would be applicable to a case wherein
the vendees purchase for their joint account, 75 still in the instant
case the buyers, although buying at the same time, acted inde72 33S Ill. App. 212, 86 N. E. (2d) S53 (1949), noted in 27 C1IGAGo-KEN'T LAW
REviEw 338.
73 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 121 , § 78.
74 Coon v. Doss, 361 Il1. 515, 198 N. E. 341, 102 A. L. R. 561 (1935); Johnson Co.
v. Beloosky, 263 Il1. 363, 105 N. E. 287 (1914).

75 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 121

, § 80.
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pendently of one another. The sale of the marble branch of the
business to the second buyer was clearly within the act for it
covered a major part of the business. 70 But was the sale to the
particular vendee held vulnerable because he knew that the entire assets were being sold or because he had purchased the entire assets of one branch of the business? The opinion fails to
provide an answer. If it is based on the second proposition, there
is occasion to doubt whether the statutory language is applicable
simply because a vendor has seen fit to divide his operations into
several departments.
Section 49 of the Chancery Act authorizes the use of a creditor's bill to reach trust funds payable to a debtor-beneficiary, with
some limitations. 77 It has been decided, in Illinois, by construction of that statute, that an unsatisfied judgment creditor may
not reach funds due his debtor where the source of those funds
rises from a trust established in good faith by one other than the
debtor. A creditor's bill will be of no avail against such a trust, 78
nor will a garnishment action79 or an attachment proceeding 8°
be effective. Even though the debtor becomes bankrupt, it has
been said that the trust funds are still protected, for title does
not pass to the bankruptcy trustee, 8 ' although the Bankruptcy
Act would seem to so provide.s2 The law, of course, places no
restriction on the beneficiary's right to make a voluntary trans83
fer of his interest.
76 Zenith Radio Distributing Corp. v. Mateer, 311 Ill. App. 263, 35 N. E. (2d)
815 (1941).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 49, denies the right when the trust has
"in good faith, been created by, or the fund so held in trust proceeded from, some
person other than the defendant himself."
78 Binns v. LaForge, 191 Ill. 598, 61 N. E. 382 (1901).
79 Baumgarden v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 135, 54
N. E. (2d) 86 (1944). See also Baumgarden v. R. F. C., 131 F. (2d) 741 (1942).
80 Dunham v. Kaufman, 385 Ill. 79, 52 N. E. (2d) 143 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGOKENT LAw REVIEW 80.

81 Hummel v. Cardwell, 390 I1. 526, 62 N. E. (2d) 433 (1945), cert. den. 327 U. S.
793, 66 S. Ct. 819, 90 L. Ed. 1020 (1946).
8252 Stat. 879; 11 U. S. C. § 110. Bankruptcy Act, § 70, sub-section (a) (5), declares that the trustee in bankruptcy is vested, by operation of law, with the
bankrupt's title to "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing
of the petition he could by any means have transferred."
83 Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 308 Ill. 519, 139 N. E. 912 (1923)
Hiss v. Hiss, 228 Ill. 414, 81 N. E. 1056 (1907) ; Binns v. LaForge, 191 Ill. 598,
61 N. E. 382 (1901) ; Blair v. Linn, 274 Ill. App. 23 (1934).
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The recent federal court decision in the case of Young v.
Handwerks4 raises serious question as to the effect of earlier
Illinois cases which had held that the statute above noted prevented the transfer of the bankrupt's interest in a trust to his
trustee in bankruptcy where the nature of the trust was nonspendthrift in character. Long prior to that proceeding, the
beneficiary of the trust had been adjudicated a bankrupt. The
proceeding was opened up some eleven years later on the ground
of a failure to schedule certain assets.85 The trust interest was
then scheduled by amendment and the bankruptcy trustee, by
plenary action,", sought an accounting against the trustees of the
trust. The district court, deeming itself bound by the earlier Illinois cases, dismissed the complaint on motion of the defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, refused
to be so bound,8 7 ruling that as the beneficiary could have made
a voluntary disposition of his interest at any time his vested
equitable interest passed to the bankrupt's trustee.
It might be suggested that the view expressed in the case is
the only one tenable in view of the express provision of the
Bankruptcy Act, but the law is left in a sorry state. So long
as there is conflict between state and federal law, creditors who
find themselves stopped cold in the state court may yet benefit
by placing the debtor-beneficiary in bankruptcy, if that is possible.
Even then, benefit will result only if the bankruptcy trustee can
bring his plenary action to reach the trust fund in a federal court
by reason of diversity of citizenship. If not, things deemed to
be assets for one purpose will not be assets for other purposes.
One other case merits attention. A purchaser at a judgment
or decree sale sleeps on his rights at his peril for, during the
84179 F. (2d) 70 (1949), noted in 1950 Ill. L. Forum 269.
85 See In re Joslyn's Estate, 171 F. (2d) 159 (1948).
86 Plenary action was necessary for the trustee of the trust was viewed as an
adverse holder to the beneficiary: Collier, Bankruptcy, Vol. 2, § 23.06, n. 24, 14th Ed.
87 Defendant relied on Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82
L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938). There is ample authority, however, for the
refusal to follow state law if it is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, both before
and after the Erie-Tompkins case: Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U. S. 78, 63 S. Ct. 93, 87 L. Ed. 64 (1942), and Page v.
Edmunds, 187 U. S. 596, 23 S. Ct. 200, 47 L. Ed. 318 (1903), are but two of many
cases in point.
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redemption period,88 he must keep a watchful eye and be ready
to act promptly and properly or he may find that his bargain is
gone. That lesson is amply driven home by the outcome of the
case of Hart v. Brown.89 It appeared therein that an obligor on
certain mortgage bonds had defaulted and the trustee had sued to
foreclose, joining all necessary parties. Foreclosure, sale, and
deficiency judgment followed in regular order, with plaintiff becoming the holder of master's certificate of sale. Defendant, one
of the bondholders, who allegedly had been represented by the
trustee in the foreclosure action, later secured a law judgment
in another court on his bonds and, on the last day for redemption by a judgment creditor, redeemed from the foreclosure sale
and received a bailiff's deed. Plaintiff then sought to have the
bailiff's deed declared void. He alleged that the judgment which
was the basis of redemption was void, hence open to collateral
attack, because the court of rendition lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter. That claim was advanced on the basis that the
bonds sued on had been merged in the foreclosure decree. He also
charged that the judgment had been fraudulently obtained because of a failure to notify the court of rendition that the bonds
were a part of the series which had been included in the foreclosure proceeding so as to make the decree therein res judicata.
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that the judgment was
valid and immune from collateral attack. His motion to dismiss
the complaint was sustained and the Supreme Court affirmed
It held that the matter, being a suit in contract, was one
over which the court of rendition had jurisdiction so as to expose its judgment only to attack by direct proceeding ° It recognized that the presence of fraud 9' would justify a collateral
88 Il1.

Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 20.
89 404 Ill. 498, 89 N. E. (2d) 370 (1950), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 365.
90 Wyman v. Hageman, 318 Ill. 64, 148 N. E. 852 (1925) ; Holt v. Snodgrass, 315
I1. 548, 146 N. E. 562 (1925). The court expressed some doubt over the point as
to whether or not the bonds were sufficiently identified to be merged in the prior
decree.
91 The obtaining of a judgment, for the purpose of making a redemption, where
no debt in fact is present, has been held to be a fraud on the court: Elting v.
First Nat. Bank, 173 Ill. 368, 50 N. E. 1095 (1898) ; Atlas National Bank v. Moore,
152 Ill. 528, 38 N. E. 684, 43 Am. St. Rep. 274 (1894). That rule was reaffirmed
only last year in Balassek v. Blaszak, 405 Ill. 36, 89 N. E. (2d) 796 (1950).
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attack, but disposed of plaintiff's charges on the basis that the
allegation was lacking in clarity and definiteness. It was said
that the mere fact that a person has pursued his remedy as a
bondholder in order to establish a standing as a judgment creditor
for the purpose of effecting a redemption is not presumptive evidence of fraud.12 The decision may, however, be but a reflection
of a policy to encourage redemption so that a debtor's prop4 It
erty may go to satisfy as much of his liability as is possible.
would also appear that if a court is asked to determine rights between a redeeming judgment creditor and a purchaser at foreclosure sale, it will, if at all possible, favor the former over the
latter.
IV.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Cases involving new developments in substantive criminal
law are, as usual, limited in number for the basic principles undergo slight change during a survey period. Some expansion of
substantive criminal law has, however, resulted from the application of basic principles to novel fact situations. It is, for example, a well established principle that an individual has the
right to commit homicide in defense of his habitation,1 if necessary, but that principle was, for the first time applied, in People
v. Eatnan,2 to the defense of a rented apartment. It was there
said that a tenant in possession had the right to use force, including homicide if necessary, if the landlord should illegally attempt to force an entrance into the premises in an effort to collect rent. But an attempt, in People v. Snith,3 to expand the
definition of habitation to include a public mine office which adjoined the defendant's living quarters failed when the court there
declined to find that any defense of the habitation was involved.
92

Williams v. Williston, 315 Ill. 178, 146 N. E. 143 (1924).

93 Karnes v. Lloyd, 52 Ill. 113 (1869); Phillips v. Demoss, 14 Ill.
409 (1853).
94 Nudelman v. Carlson, 375 Ill. 577, 32 N. E. (2d) 142 (1941) ; Strauss v. Tuck-

horn, 200 Ill. 75, 65 N. E. 683 (1902) ; Whitehead v. Hall, 148 Ill.253, 35 N. E. 871
(1893).
1 People v. Osborne, 278 Ill. 104, 115 N. E. 890 (1917) ; Foster v. Shepherd, 258
Ill. 164, 101 N. E. 411 (1913) ; Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142, 72 N. E. 792 (1905).
2405 Ill. 491, 91 N. E. (2d) 387 (1950).
3404 Ill. 125, 88N. E. (2d) 444 (1949).

